The Government of Libya was responsible for the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 on 21 December 1988. This reviews both evidentiary material upon which the US indictment of two Libyan officials is based and background information that establishes links between those indicted and senior Libyan Government officials.

Summary

Scottish authorities and the US Department of Justice have charged two Libyans with carrying out the attack: Abd al-Basit Al-Megrahi, a senior Libyan intelligence official, and Lamen Fhimah, the former manager of the Libyan Arab Airlines (LAA) office of Malta. The charges are based on clear evidence that Al-Megrahi, Fhimah, and other unidentified coconspirators planned to bomb Pan Am 103 by:

-- Obtaining and attaching an appropriately marked Air Malta tag that circumvented baggage security measures and routed the bag containing the bomb to the Pan Am feeder flight to Heathrow and then to Pan Am 103.

-- Setting the timer that activated the device so that the bomb would explode about one hour after Pan Am 103 was scheduled to depart Heathrow Airport in London.

-- Using the knowledge and access gained from their official status as representatives of Libyan Arab Airlines (LAA) to facilitate the operation at Valletta's Luqa airport. This would have enabled them to bypass security checks and ensure that the suitcase containing the bomb was inserted into the baggage of an Air Malta flight to Frankfurt.

Al-Megrahi, a senior Libyan intelligence official, acted with the approval of the highest levels of the Libyan Government. We believe Sa'id Rashid--a leading architect and executor of Libya's anti-US and antidissident terrorist policies for the last decade, and a member of the Libyan Government's inner circle--was the senior government official who orchestrated the attack. An operation of this sophistication and magnitude, involving people so close to the Libyan leadership, could have been undertaken only with the approval of senior Libyan officials.

The Case

The US indictment is based on evidence directly linking Libyan officials to the suitcase containing the bomb and its insertion into the baggage system. The evidence also directly links Al-Megrahi to the Swiss company that manufactured the timer used in the attack.

The Suitcase

Forensic analysis has identified the bag that contained the Pan Am 103 bomb as a brown, hard-sided Samsonite suitcase. The following evidence links Al-Megrahi and Fhimah to the suitcase:

-- Al-Megrahi, traveling in alias, arrived in Valletta with Fhimah from Libya on the evening of 20 December 1988--the day before the bombing. Fhimah, the former manager of the LAA office in Valletta, retained full access to the airport. Al-Megrahi and Fhimah brought a large, brown hard-sided Samsonite suitcase with them into Malta on that occasion.

-- Scottish investigators traced clothing that had been packed in the bomb suitcase to a Maltese clothing shop. A Libyan bought the items several weeks before the bombing, most likely on 7 December 1988. Airport arrival cards demonstrate that Al-Megrahi was in Malta on 7 December.

-- In February 1991, Al-Megrahi was described as resembling the Libyan who had purchased the clothing items.

The Insertion

Frankfurt airport records for 21 December show that an unaccompanied bag was routed from Air Malta Flight 180 (KM 180), out of Valletta's Luqa airport, to Frankfurt, where it was loaded onto the Pan Am 103 feeder flight to London. The evidence indicates that a properly marked Air Malta baggage tag would have routed the suitcase containing the bomb to John F. Kennedy Airport in New York via Pan Am 103. The following evidence implicates Al-Megrahi and Fhimah in this process:

-- Fhimah's diary contains a reminder for 15 December 1988 to pick up Air Malta tags--a violation of airport and airline regulations. Other diary notations indicate that Fhimah accomplished this task.

-- According to Luqa airport records and staff, the baggage for KM 180 was processed at about the same time as their bags for a Libyan Arab Airlines flight (LN 147), bound for Tripoli.

-- Al-Megrahi, still traveling in alias, boarded LN 147 on the morning of 21 December 1988, the same morning that the bomb was inserted into the baggage of the KM 180 flight. Al-Megrahi's flight back to Libya checked in at the same airport passenger check-in counter as KM 180, and the check-in periods for the two flights overlapped.

The Timer

A circuit board fragment recovered from the Pan Am 103 bomb was part of a sophisticated electronic timer of a type that Senegalese authorities discovered in the possession of two Libyan terrorists arrested in February 1988. The timers, marked MST-13, were manufactured by Meister et Bollier (MEBO), a Swiss electronics firm located in Zurich.

The MST-13 timers are unique. MEBO was the sole manufacturer. All the MST-13 timers produced were delivered to the Libyans.

MEBO provided the Libyan External Security Organization (ESO, also referred to as Jamahirya Security Organization [JSO]) with 20 MST-13 timers in late 1985 and made no more MST-13 timers. Two ESO electrical engineers commissioned and took possession of the timers: Izz Aldin Hinshiri, Libya's current Minister of Communications and Transport, and Sa'id Rashid.

Al-Megrahi is a close relative and longtime associate of Sa'id Rashid. At the time Rashid took delivery of the timers, Al-Megrahi was his immediate subordinate.

Al-Megrahi rented office space at MEBO and transited Zurich on at least two occasions in December 1988.

Libyan Government Responsibility

The conclusion that the Libyan Government approved the Pan Am 103 bombing is based on Abd-al-Besit Al-Megrahi's central and continuing role in Libyan intelligence operations and on his close association with Libyan Government officials who have implemented and directed Libya's use of terrorism over the years as a tool of government policy. The career progress of these officials over the years indicates that the Libyan Government has consistently endorsed their operations, tactics, and targets.

Al-Megrahi's Intelligence Responsibilities

Abd al-Basit Al-Megrahi's deep involvement in Libya's most sensitive, high-priority procurement operations indicates that he enjoyed the fullest confidence of Libya's leadership. We believe that his contacts and experience in the fields of civil aviation, cargo movement, and small business operations also provided him with a ready-made infrastructure to support the staging of the Pan Am 103 bombing.

Al-Megrahi is a senior intelligence official with strong ties to Libya's military procurement apparatus and to the ESO. In 1987 he became the director of the Center for Strategic Studies (CSS), a unit that served the ESO and the Department of Military Procurement through a variety of activities, including:

-- Procurement of chemical weapons precursors. An Al-Megrahi subordinate operating in Germany in 1988 played an important role in acquiring and shipping chemical weapons precursors to Libya. Al-Megrahi is also linked to a senior manager of Libya's chemical weapons development program.

-- Procurement of aircraft and aircraft components for the Libyan military and LAA. Badri Hasan, another close collaborator of Al-Megrahi, is one of Libya's leading experts in circumventing US embargo provisions barring the sale of US technology and aircraft components to Libya.

-- Assisting with Libya's effort to co-opt or sponsor Latin American terrorist groups. Under Al-Megrahi's leadership, the CSS assisted other Libyan outreach agencies by contributing to propaganda campaigns, collecting intelligence on the attitudes of radical groups, and assessing the intelligence or operational utility of Arabs who resided in target countries.

-- Setting up travel agencies and other front companies to facilitate the travel and movement of goods and people, an activity that we believe supported both the procurement and outreach programs of the CSS and other Libyan intelligence entities.

Senior Libyans who worked closely with Al-Megrahi and other CSS officials involved in these activities include:

-- Col. Rifi Ali Al-Sharif, a senior Libyan military officer with a prominent role in Libya's procurement effort. Col. Al-Sharif, the mentor/patron of Badri Hasan, reportedly assisted efforts by Al-Megrahi and Badri Hasan to illegally acquire US aircraft via Benin in 1986 and 1987 and sponsored the establishment of a travel agency as a joint CSS/military procurement enterprise in Eastern Europe.

-- Sa'id Rashid, who in 1988 paid and instructed the chemical weapons precursor procurement specialist working for Al-Megrahi in Germany.

Al-Megrahi's Terrorist Record

Al-Megrahi's position and contacts in the Libyan intelligence apparatus place him firmly in the camp of his first cousin Sa'id Rashid--a leading architect and implementer of Libya's terrorist policies and a powerful member of the Libyan Government's inner circle. For at least two years before his early 1987 appointment as CSS director, Al-Megrahi was ESO chief of airline security, reporting directly to Rashid, who was ESO chief of operations throughout 1986.

Al-Megrahi continued his terrorist activities after becoming CSS director in early 1987. During 1988, Al-Megrahi:

-- Met in Malta with a team of Libyan intelligence operatives planning to travel to Chad to conduct an unspecified operation. Abdallah Sanussi--newly appointed chief of ESO operations--ordered the team to abort the operation when it was unable to make appropriate airline connections. Sanussi is one of four Libyans whom France indicted on 30 October 1991 for the September 1989 bombing of UTA 772, which exploded after leaving Ndjamena airport in Chad.

-- Met with Greek arms dealers and expressed interest in acquiring 1,000 letter bombs and associated technical equipment.

Sa'id Rashid and Libyan Terrorist Operations

Sa'id Rashid has managed a sustained Libyan effort to conduct terrorist attacks against US interests since the early 1980s. Rashid has long enjoyed privileged access to the top levels of the Libyan Government and is involved in a wide range of intelligence activities. He is a senior member of the Revolutionary Committees Bureau, which oversees the execution of the Libyan Government's radical policies in Libya and abroad.

Rashid rose rapidly in the ESO and in Libya's revolutionary committee apparatus during the early and mid-1980s, while aggressively pursuing the Libyan Government's dissident assassination programs and the terrorist and subversive aspects of the government's African policies.

An Italian court has sentenced Rashid in absentia to life imprisonment for his leadership of a team that assassinated a Libyan exile in a Milan train station in July 1980. This assassination was one of many in an antidissident campaign that spanned Western Europe and was directed by Rashid through at least 1985:

-- In October 1980, Rashid led a team to Togo that planned to assassinate Chadian President Hissan Habre.

-- In 1983, Libya illegally detained 37 French citizens in a successful effort to force France to release Rashid, who had been jailed in Paris pending extradition to Italy on murder changes related to the 1980 assassination in Milan.

Rashid began to direct attacks specifically against US interests in late 1981, when he assumed overall operational responsibility for Libya's effort to overthrow the Sudanese regime of President Ja'far Numeiri, then a close ally of the United States. During this period, Rashid and his subordinates trained, equipped, and directed Sudanese terrorists who attempted to bomb US interests on several occasions using concealed bombs equipped with decade timers and containing Semtex-H. Decade timers were a signature item of Libyan and Libyan-sponsored terrorists during the early 1980s.

One such bomb, concealed in a cigarette carton, was used in a failed attempt to bomb a Pan Am flight in December 1983. The terrorist attempted to check an unaccompanied bag onto an Alitalia flight departing Istanbul for Rome. The bag, which was discovered by Turkish authorities as a result of heightened security procedures, was tagged in such a way that it would have connected with a Pan Am flight departing Rome for New York, thus following essentially the same procedure that succeeded in the case of Pan Am 103.

Rashid continued to play a key role in Libyan targeting of US interests after tensions mounted between the two countries in mid-1985:

-- Rashid's operatives began planning an attack on US facilities in Turkey in early 1986, culminating in a failed attempt to bomb the US Officers Club in Ankara in late April 1986. The Libyan intelligence officer who directed the operation within Turkey was operating under cover as an LAA official.

-- Rashid tasked several Palestinians to target US facilities in Germany and directed the April 1986 bombing of the La Belle disco in Berlin. The La Belle bomb, specifically intended to kill American service personnel and their dependents, killed three people--two of them Americans.

-- The day after the La Belle disco bombing, Rashid traveled to Khartoum, where he continued his work with Sudanese oppositionists. Rashid was in Khartoum on 15 April 1986 when a US Embassy official was seriously wounded in retaliation for the US bombing of Libya earlier the same day.

-- Rashid was one of the Libyan engineers who provided design specifications to the Swiss firm MEBO which manufactured the timer used in the Pan Am 103 bomb. He also demonstrated a MEBO remotely activated briefcase bomb to Palestinian recruits.

-- Both the Libyans arrested in Senegal with the MEBO timer had been Rashid's subordinates since the early 1980s.

In early 1987, the Libyan Government moved Rashid from the ESO to the directorship of the Libyan Electronics Company, which is heavily involved in technology transfer and other procurement activities. At the same time the Libyan Government placed Al-Megrahi in charge of the Center for Strategic Studies. We believe that the two cousins continued to coordinate their activities as they became more deeply involved in procurement programs--as in their joint supervision of Al-Megrahi's chemical weapons procurement specialist in Germany.

Al-Megrahi's Other Supervisors

Al-Megrahi, as CSS director, reported, or can be linked directly, to the following prominent Libyans:

-- ESO director Ibrahim al-Bishari used Al-Megrahi's office at MEBO, in Zurich, as an accommodation address and claimed that Al-Megrahi worked directly under him as director of the CSS. Al-Bishari is currently Libya's Foreign Minister and reportedly retains his intelligence portfolio.

-- In fall 1988, Abdallah al-Sanussi was Al-Megrahi's immediate ESO supervisor. Al-Megrahi was a terrorist who worked at the CSS for Sanussi. Al-Sanussi is one of the Libyan Government's chief intelligence aides. He authorized, directed, and provided funding for a number of Libyan terrorist operations over the years. French judicial authorities have lodged criminal charges against al-Sanussi for the September 1989 bombing of UTA 772.

-- Nasir Ali Ashur has been linked both to Al-Megrahi and to the MEBO timers. Ashur, who oversaw earlier tests of the timers to ensure they would be completely destroyed by an explosion, was seen at a meeting at Al-Megrahi's house two days before the Pan Am 103 bombing. Maltese embarkation records and a US intelligence source also show that Ashur and Al-Megrahi met in Malta in early October 1988 and that the two traveled together from Zurich to Malta in August 1987. Ashur has been declared by the French to be the equivalent of an unindicted coconspirator for his management of Libya's policies of providing massive amounts of arms--including tons of Semtex-H--to the Provisional Irish Republican Army.

-- Abdallah Mahmud Hijazi is probably also a key contact of Al-Megrahi, although we lack concrete evidence of direct linkage. Hijazi, Rashid's longtime patron, was until 1986 the director of Libya's Department of Military Procurement. In 1988, he was reportedly a key organizer of Libyan subversive operations in West Africa and Chad.

-- Ibrahim Nayili, whom the French indicted on 30 October 1991 for his role in the bombing of UTA 772, has been identified by several sources as the ESO official in Athens who placed potential sources of arms and aircraft components in contact with Al-Megrahi. Al-Nayili became ESO chief of airline security in mid-1989--the same position that Al-Megrahi held before becoming CSS director.

The Historical Context

The foregoing has described Libya's links to Pan Am 103, the individuals involved, and the central role those individuals play in the terrorist and intelligence programs of the Libyan Government. The terrorist case against the government does not begin or end with the destruction of Pan Am 103. We have seen a consistent pattern of Libyan-inspired terrorism that continues after the Pan Am 103 atrocity to the present. This pattern seriously undermines any argument that Pan Am 103 was a rogue operation that did not meet with the approval of Libya's most senior authorities. An operation this important could not have been undertaken without the consent of the highest levels of the Libyan Government.

Source: United States Department of State, April 1992.